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This paper argues that the continued emphasis on ethno-philosophy and the relative absence of 
intellectual passion and curiosity are the greatest challenges facing African philosophy. The 
paper rejects the racist lamentation of scholars such as Olufemi Taiwo who blame the West for 
Africa’s absence from the stage of world philosophy. It highlights the link between L.S. 
Senghor’s doctrine of negritude, the philosophy of Innocent Asouzu, and the emerging synthesis 
of consolationism to underline the fact that African philosophy has made some progress, 
although things could be much better. The paper concludes by urging African philosophers to be 
more radical and innovative in their thinking, as innovation and originality are the only 
conditions for the universal acceptance of, and interest in, African philosophy. 
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Introduction 
That African philosophy as a tradition has come to stay is beyond dispute. That Africa is largely 
absent from the stage of world philosophy, and, by implication, world intellectual history, is 
equally incontrovertible. A people’s level of philosophical advancement is always a measure of 
their intellectual development. Although we can assert the existence of African philosophy, our 
confidence diminishes and threatens to evaporate altogether when the question is asked whether 
this tradition has justified its existence. The failure to achieve this justification by far accounts 
for the peculiar absence of Africa from the stage of w rld philosophy. While it is true that racial 
considerations must be factored into the dilemma of African philosophy, we must remember that 
we are in the information age which is also an intellectually liberal age. It will be tantamount to 
crass intellectual dishonesty for white intellectuals to ignore African philosophical masterpieces - 
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whenever these masterpieces emerge - for the reason that such masterpieces are the products of 
men and women with black skins. 
 
While it is true that ethno-philosophy marked a watershed in the history of African philosophy, it 
cannot advance African philosophy beyond the foundation level which it actually is. Ethno-
philosophy is the foundation of African philosophy rather than the definitive African philosophy 
because it represents the first attempt to render the worldviews of the various African tribes1 in a 
philosophically intelligible mode, thereby reducing oral philosophy to written philosophy and 
launching African philosophy as a written tradition, i  the very process of the systematization of 
tribal worldviews. 
 
Hegel’s conviction concerning the incapacity of the black African to think rationally, as 
expressed in his Philosophy of History (1991), has continued to elicit righteous fury from 
African philosophical scholars, who have left the substance of his statement (no doubt inspired 
by ignorance) to chase shadows. In this paper we will argue that:  
1. Hegel’s error should be interpreted by contemporary Af ican philosophers as a call to 
Africa to take note of its philosophical stagnation, a d to engage in the kind of radical 
thinking that can move African philosophy forward.  
2. African philosophical scholars have not done enough to win international acclaim for 
African philosophy. 
3. The emergent philosophical currents of complementary reflection and consolation 
philosophy have paved the way for the 21st century eclipsing of ethno-philosophy 
towards greater innovation and radical individuality in African philosophy. 
                                                 
1 I use the word ‘tribe’ or the plural form ‘tribes’ in this paper to underline uniqueness or separateness and 
primordiality. 
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4. Since our own shortcomings rather than Hegel and Western intellectual racism is largely 
responsible for the inferior status of African philosophy in the global scene, the work of 
earning international acclaim for African philosophy must now begin in earnest. 
 
The next section highlights Hegel’s misconception about the African’s capacity for abstract 
thought, and considers the reactions of some African scholars, especially Taiwo’s eloquent 
response in the essay “Exorcizing Hegel’s Ghost: Africa’s Challenge to Philosophy” (1998). The 
subsequent section reconsiders the state of African philosophy today and the continued 
dominance of the ethno-philosophical sub-tradition which prevents the African intellect from 
liberating itself from the grip of mythology and the tribe. Thereafter, we trace the birth of an 
authentic African rationalism from Senghor’s negritude to Asouzu’s complementary reflection. 
The last section before the conclusion briefly introduces the emergent current of consolation 
philosophy as an example of the innovative, individual thinking of the future and the 
radicalization of Senghor and Asouzu. 
 
 
The Hegelian Misconception 
At the heart of the great fury among many African philosophers is Hegel’s submission that the 
category of universality is alien to the mental struc ure of the African, insisting scandalously that 
“The Negro, …, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay 
aside all thought of reverence or morality - all that we call feeling - if we are to comprehend him; 
there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this character” (Hegel 1991, 93). 
 
Denying rationality to Africans is the same thing as saying they are incapable of producing 
philosophy (Njoku 2002, 8.). Yet we cannot help but agree with Mbiti (1969, 1) that some sort of 
philosophy underlies the thought and practice of all peoples. Murungi (2010) takes umbrage at 
Hegel’s sacrilege and bemoans the West’s exploitatin of Africa. Similarly, waxing eloquent on 
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the same theme refined, Taiwo (1998) demands: “Why is there so little, if any, respect for and, as 
a consequence, interest in African phenomena and their p ilosophical resonances?” He thinks 
that this unfortunate state of affairs can be traced to the Hegelian misconception and its evolution 
and mutation over the years in the Western mind. In other words, as he sees it, there is a racist 
motivation behind the unwillingness of Western philosophers to pay attention to African 
philosophy, even though they gladly explore the possibilities of Oriental philosophies. Taiwo 
(1998) permits us a moment of truth when he declares that “the West, in constructing the 
universal, instead of truly embracing all that there is, or at least what of it can be so embraced, 
has merely puffed itself up and invited the rest of humanity, or the educated segment of it, to be 
complicit in this historical swindle.” 
 
Taiwo notes that contemporary Western philosophers may not be as crude as Hegel was, but that 
they have refined the tactics of marginalization. For instance, works of African philosophy 
considered unworthy of sitting in philosophy shelves are redirected to Anthropology, Political 
Science, Folklore, and African Studies shelves. Taiwo (1998) concludes with telling 
disappointment: “What is worse, even the limited presence in the form of libel that members of 
Hegel’s generation represented in their writings ha been expunged by their contemporary 
numbers: hence the peculiar absence. Africa is not overtly condemned as it was in Hegel’s day; it 
is simply ignored or made to suffer the ultimate insult of having its being unacknowledged. One 
is right to wonder whether it is worse to be libeled than to be passed over in silence.” 
 
The assertion by Horton (1993, 2) that Western langu ges (for example English and German) 
and Western paradigms provide a standard and universally current medium for the comparison of 
Western and non-Western thought systems appears to support Taiwo’s fears that there is a 
Western conspiracy to shut out Africa from world philosophical discourse. However, the claim 
that there is a conscious racial conspiracy to denigrate the black intellect is debatable. Could it be 
that we Africans have not done enough to make African philosophy competitive on the world 
stage? The most appropriate response to the Hegelian m sconception and the intellectual 
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perversity of Hegel’s descendents is to think radiclly, individually, and with a level of 
originality no longer to be found even in Western philosophy itself. 
 
African Philosophy Today 
A reader going through a typical African philosophy text will be struck by the intensely 
polemical character of what goes by the name African philosophy. The dominance of polemic in 
African philosophy can be explained by the absence of original philosophers. In the absence of 
originality, analysis is compelled to serve polemic rather than substantive thinking. Ethno-
philosophy, the dominant school in African philosophy, alone produced flashes of originality 
over a long period, with the investigations of eminent thinkers such as Gbadegesin (1991), 
Wiredu (1998), Gyekye (1995), Oruka (1990), and others unearthing tribal philosophical views 
that are distinctly African. Yet the ethno-philosophical enterprise restricted the initiative of the 
individual thinker by tying him to the tribe, for which the entire enterprise has been criticized by 
universalists such as Hountondji (1996, 63ff) and Asouzu (2007, 40-47), and hermeneutic 
thinkers such as Theophilus Okere (1983, 15). 
 
Nevertheless, I think that as the foundation of African philosophy, ethno-philosophy can only be 
disparaged when it equates itself with the whole of African philosophy. The greatest challenge to 
African philosophy is that of negotiating the transition from ethno-philosophy to individual 
thinking independent of the tribe. The future of our tradition lies with originality and 
individuality. I do not blanket-condemn ethno-philosophy: after all, our own individuality takes 
off from the launch pad of ethno-philosophy. The point I emphasise is that it is time for African 
philosophy to grow robustly and, in the process of gr wth, justify itself as a tradition worthy of 
universal acclaim. While admitting that African philosophy has won a grudging recognition 
thanks to the ethno-philosophers, Asouzu (2007b, 292) writes: “A greater difficulty relates to 
what it takes to uphold this recognition. This can only happen through sustained constructive 
efforts to make it [African philosophy] attractive. By every indication, this appears not to be the 
case always going by the state of philosophy in most institutions of learning in Africa today.” 
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Do we really take African philosophy seriously, or are we resigned for ever to being led by the 
Western philosophical imagination? My pessimism springs from the realization that philosophy 
departments in African universities propagate the ideas of Western philosophers far more than 
they promote those of African philosophers. Lecturers and students alike sniff scornfully at 
African philosophy. There is an explanation for this regrettable perversity. These lecturers and 
students cannot see why they should waste their time studying a tradition that has largely failed 
to produce exciting thinkers. In other words, the contempt arises from the near complete absence 
of original and radical ideas in African philosophy. African students are awe-struck by the 
mighty achievements of Western philosophy. Not surprisingly, they compare Western 
philosophy with African philosophy, and scorn the latter when they realize that Africa cannot 
boast of its own Spinoza, Marcel, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Santayana, etc. 
 
In response to my concern above, some of my readers will ay that there is no need for African 
philosophy to seek universal acceptance or the approbation of the West. This position is true if it 
means we do not have to be subservient to the West. However, I must disagree with the position 
if it seeks to isolate African philosophy from Westrn philosophy, because philosophy is a 
universal intellectual engagement, and it will do humanity much good if diverse philosophical 
traditions meet in dialogue that involves reciprocal respect. 
 
Makinde (1998) is definitely not a believer in isolation, for he has asked the West to step in and 
save African philosophy from extinction, raising this lamentation: “If the prevailing condition of 
philosophy in Africa is anything to go by, we may just as well begin to sing the Nunc Dimittis of 
this important discipline in Africa. …. I do not foresee the growth of philosophy as we would 
have wanted it in Africa, unless such drastic situation occurs such as would bring about a 
reversal of fortune for the discipline” (Makinde 1998). Even as he believes the West can save 
African philosophy, he is not sure what form the Western intervention should take. Can we dare 
to say that the intervention sought by Makinde can only come from within Africa itself in the 
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form of innovative thinking and radical individuality on the part of African philosophers in the 
21st century? 
 
It is noteworthy that unlike Taiwo (1998), Makinde (1998) has not blamed Hegel’s children for 
the parlous state of African philosophical thought. While Taiwo the exiled African who 
encounters racism laments the racially motivated neglect of African philosophy by Western 
scholars, Makinde the Africa-based scholar bemoans the absence of robust growth and the 
neglect of African philosophy by Africans. There seems to be something ironic in the 
lamentations of Taiwo and Makinde when linked together by their common concern: while 
Taiwo looks towards the West with suspicion, Makinde looks towards the same West for help. Is 
it easy to reconcile the lamentations of these two eminent scholars? Yes. In making the 
reconciliation, I say that African philosophers have not done enough to earn African philosophy 
recognition throughout the world. If we can make thdiscipline attractive enough, the world will 
take note. For the world to take note, we ourselves mu t take note by realizing our precarious 
position in the world and work passionately, tirelessly, and with great honesty to make African 
philosophy a truly great tradition. The solution to the dilemma of African philosophy lies with us 
Africans. All that is required is that we think harde  than we have ever done beyond the limit of 
ethno-philosophy and support our best brains. 
 
Kwasi Wiredu, who has inspired many African philosophical thinkers with his emphasis on the 
need for the decolonization of African philosophy, is under no illusion that tribal philosophies 
will take the tradition anywhere. He calls for the direct interrogation of nature, the seeking of 
answers to questions such as, “What is truth, goodness, freedom, time, causality, justice? What is 
the origin of the universe, the meaning of life, the destiny of the human soul (whatever it is)? 
What are the principles of correct reasoning? What are the best ways of acquiring knowledge? … 
we contemporary Africans have a duty to venture suggestions on these matters. In doing so, we 
will, of course, have to take due account of our heitage, as philosophers in other cultures 
routinely do” (Wiredu 1998). 
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Obviously, African thinkers have not yet taken up Wiredu’s challenge. Wiredu demands for 
original thinking. It is true that many African thinkers in their great haste and zeal to massage the 
big ego of the tribe have eagerly and chaotically inqu red into the problems raised by Wiredu as 
legitimate questions of African philosophy; yet they have gone about this business largely with 
the interest of the tribe at heart rather than the int rest of the great tradition in the making. A 
reading of what these scholars have written about God, immortality, necessity, time, the person, 
etc, reveals a remarkable uniformity of underlying thoughts, which confirms my position that 
they add little or nothing to the intellectual achievements of the tribe. Instead, they merely 
illuminate tribal worldviews using Western philosophical categories. For example, what a 
Yoruba philosopher such as Gbadegesin (1991, 27ff) says about the divisibility of the concept of 
the person into physical and spiritual components is not radically different from what an Akan 
scholar such as Gyekye (1995, 83ff) says about the dualist and interactionist conception of the 
person. Indeed, Wiredu, the apostle of decolonization, realizes how deeply frivolous tribal 
philosophizing can demean our tradition; for he insists that ‘decolonization’ is only an initial 
preoccupation of the post-colonial reconstruction era, adding that “The time will come when 
there would be, for the most part, no pressing need for the kind of particularism discussed above 
here” (Wiredu 1998). 
 
The time has come for the individual African thinker to leap over the hurdle of particularism. 
Ethno-philosophy as an achievement exhausted the ing nuity and power of the particularist 
interest or what Wiredu calls decolonization but which we regard as an appeal for originality. We 
must move up to meet the world. The African character of our thinking will not be lost once our 
philosophical imagination is original, since we will not appeal to Greece for inspiration. The 
foundation that is ethno-philosophy and the worldviews of the tribe are sufficient to fire our 
philosophical imagination as an inspiration for thecentury. African philosophers have not dared 
to think with the kind of radicality that alone can earn the respect of the West whose approbation 
we greatly desire since we lack an intellectual culture robust enough to provide such 
approbation. For four decades we were content equating African philosophy with ethno-
philosophy, and this was a monumental error. Philosophers such as Wiredu (1980, 39) and 
Hountondji (1996) who saw with commendable acuity that ethno-philosophy could not be the 
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essence of African philosophy did not, unfortunately, provide an alternative rich and radical 
enough to earn the universal acclaim we crave. 
 
In my considered opinion, in the African philosophical environment there are three types of 
thinkers, namely: 
1. Scholars of Western philosophy. 
2. Ethno-philosophers. 
3. African philosophers. 
I have presented my classification in an increasing order of eminence. The scholars of Western 
philosophy are the least eminent, being the least original, while the African philosophers are the 
most eminent, the most original, and the fewest. The scholars of Western philosophy are to be 
found in abundance in the philosophy departments of African universities teaching courses in 
Western philosophy, and relatively unperturbed by the questions that rage in African philosophy. 
The eminence of the ethno-philosophers over the scholars of Western philosophy stems from the 
fact that the former helped establish ethno-philosophy as the foundation of African philosophy. 
The African philosophers are the most accomplished b cause of the magnitude of their 
individual contributions to the development of African philosophy. Often these eminent thinkers 
double as scholars of Western philosophy and ethno-p il sophy, as in the cases of Wiredu, 
Gyekye, Oruka, and Gbadegesin. Every serious African thinker in the field of philosophy is 
understandably a scholar of Western philosophy. Notall African philosophical thinkers are 
ethno-philosophers. L.S. Senghor falls into the ethno-philosophical category, but cannot be 
allowed entry into the more eminent category of African philosophers. Yet this poet-politician, in 
my opinion, envisioned the most radical philosophical doctrine in the whole of African thought, 
one from which Innocent Asouzu indirectly benefitted and from which we emergent 
consolationist thinkers are directly benefitting, as we will soon show. Like Paulin J. Hountondji, 
Asouzu has refused to be an ethno-philosopher: he is a scholar of Western philosophy and a 
member of the elite category of African philosophers distinguished by their originality. 
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From L.S. Senghor to Innocent Asouzu: The Search for the Elusive African 
Synthesis 
The emergence of Innocent Asouzu in Nigeria, coming over five decades after Senghor’s radical 
move towards the articulation of a majestic philosophical system with an authentic African 
inspiration, is something worth rejoicing about. Asouzu is, in my opinion, the first thinker to 
produce a Nigerian, and therefore African, philosophy. Although Igbo, his thoughts are not 
restricted to the worldviews of his Igbo people. Because his thoughts are universal, they 
reconcile the tribe not only with the nation, but also with humanity. While other Igbo 
philosophical scholars such as Njoku (2009) and Edeh (1999) overtly proclaim their Igboness, 
Asouzu has claimed his Igboness for Nigeria and the world. His monistic philosophy traces its 
inspiration to the essentially holistic worldview of Black Africa. This holism is the search of all 
isolated instances of reality – or what Asouzu (2004, 312) calls missing links – for unity in their 
complementarity. 
 
Senghor tells us that negritude as an idea expresses a distinctly African way of life. Though 
distinct from Westernism, it does not have to fundamentally oppose Westernism because it is in 
its essence a vision of man, an African humanism. For Senghor negritude is animated by 
“intuitive reason, because this sentient reason … expresses itself emotionally, through that self-
surrender, that coalescence of subject and object, through myths, by which I mean the archetypal 
images of the collective soul, synchronized with those of the cosmos … the sense of communion, 
the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm … the essential elements of Negritude, which you 
will find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man” (quoted in Njoku 
2002, 49). Senghor famously or infamously contrasted th  analytical intelligence of the Western 
man with the emotional intelligence of the African man. While I agree that Senghor arrived at an 
exaggeration, I have, nevertheless, been able to pierce the superficiality of the Senghorian 
exaggeration to grasp the revolutionary character of the undeveloped thought of this most 
original thinker, the insight which must have dawned on John Sodipo (1975, 117) who 
rhapsodized over Senghor thus: “Whatever fault one may find with the articulation and content 
he gave to the conception [negritude] it is in my view to Leopold Senghor’s eternal credit that he 
boldly even if poetically asserted the existence of a distinctly African conception of the universe 
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and of a mode of existence founded upon that conception.” In Senghor’s elevation of emotion to 
a prominent position, in celebrating what Senghor himself called the gift of mythmaking and the 
inclusive African communalism, the great poet was trying to explicate a universal philosophy 
founded on a genuine African inspiration. 
 
Despite the Bergsonian and Sartrean influences noticeable in Senghor, he sought an 
epistemological instrument independent of the Western knowledge model. He desired a truly 
African model that would not bow the knee to Greece, but which would be so universally 
applicable as to achieve the complementarity Asouzu was later to unravel in Ibuanyidanda 
philosophy or complementary reflection. The optimistic philosophy of Senghor that lay hidden in 
the idea of negritude came to the fore in Asouzu (2004, 312ff; 2007a, 176ff; 2011, 100-106), 
who insisted on the joy of being (analogous to the gift of rhythm Senghor promoted) as the 
natural phenomenological result for the consciousnes  that totalizes itself in the increasing 
unification of diversity. Diversity breaks up into missing links, but the mind sees these isolated 
links as conducing to a more perfect whole, the advancing complement, in the convergence of 
being which yields joy for consciousness. This is the kernel of Asouzu’s complementary 
reflection. It is a radicalization of Senghor’s optimism, a further extension and universalization 
of the humanism implicit in negritude. 
 
Asouzu’s achievement is his ability to give analytical coherence to the inspiration that came 
powerfully to Senghor. On the basis of his monistic ystem, Asouzu arrives at the following 
principles of Ibuanyidanda philosophy which once again underline the link between him and 
Senghor: 
1. The principle of integration, which states that anything that exists serves a missing link of 
reality. 
2. The principle of progressive transformation, which states that all human actions are geared 
towards the joy of being. 
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3. The imperative of Ibuanyidanda philosophy, which states that “allow the limitations of being 
to be the cause of your joy”. 
4. The truth and authenticity criterion, which states that “never elevate any world immanent 
missing link to an absolute instance” (Asouzu 2011, 105). 
 
Whereas Senghor tried to formulate a complementary philosophy with universal applicability, 
projecting a strong humanistic perspective, and sadly failed to escape the limitation of 
particularism, Asouzu succeeded in escaping the bounds of the African particular to arrive at a 
universal formulation. Both men were advancing an optimistic philosophy founded on the 
essentially optimistic African worldview. Nevertheless, while Senghor (1995, 121) remained 
enthralled by the black man’s uniqueness (even as an African humanism is being projected 
towards the world) and rhapsodized about the black man’s gift of rhythm and intuition, Asouzu 
(2011, 105 ff.) broadened this humanistic vision with his concept of missing links as ultimately 
conducing to human joy. The former kept hammering at his Africanity while the latter had 
ceased to be obsessed with Africa and had recognized h mself as a true African philosopher (and 
therefore a true philosopher) – a black thinker who addresses the world as a human being. 
Asouzu came as a Kant preaching his prolegomena and telling us how we are to proceed with the 
business of philosophizing in a continuously globalizing world, which, therefore, must be 
characterized by reconciliation. 
 
My own reflections have been driven by a passionate desire to ground African philosophical 
thinking in an authentic African rationalism which is, nevertheless, universally relevant (Agada 
2010; 2011).2 The Ibuanyidanda (complementarity as a phenomenon) of Asouzu was the tonic I 
needed to reconcile Africa to the world by showing that my uniquely African vision of the 
universe is in solidarity with the basic ideas of the Occident and Orient. I agree with Masolo 
(2010, 33-34) that the African thinker must throw off the yoke of intellectual dependence on the 
                                                 
2 The treatise Existence and Consolation, which is the culmination of my researches, is being prepared for 
publication. 
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Western intellect. Yet this does not mean that we should think with less intellectual rigour than 
Western philosophers. On examining books on the African philosophy shelves of any library 
fortunate enough to have them, one notices the preponderance of ethno-philosophical texts and 
almost entirely polemical works in the philosophy of culture. One will search in vain for any 
great metaphysical, logical, and epistemological work. Since we have opted for the easy way in 
the name of pursuing a uniquely African mode of thinking, the Western thinkers have 
conveniently ignored our tradition to the anger andgrief of men such as Taiwo. In my opinion, 
African philosophy is different from Western and Oriental philosophies only in the sense of the 
divergence of the African experience of the world, not because African philosophy has a 
different subject matter. Black thinkers such as Cheikh Anta Diop (1991) and Innocent 
Onyewuenyi (1993) have, in fact, argued for the African origin of Greek philosophy, and, by 
implication, Western philosophy. 
 
Asouzu radicalized Senghor. We too must radicalize Asouzu because he did not provide a rich 
metaphysical content to his optimistic philosophy, and over-indulged in dry polemic. The 
moment we realize that the emotional African Senghor presented to the world is actually the 
melancholy man, we will no longer be furious with that original thinker. The man whose 
philosophical history Senghor was trying to capture is the universal man. If he presented this 
universal man (the melancholy man) as an African, it was simply because he was not equal to the 
great task before him - the task of becoming a profound philosopher rather than a fine poet. 
Having failed in his bid to become an African philosopher, Senghor was content asserting 
wrongly that the melancholy man is black in colour. Senghor’s contribution to epistemology, 
which, again, he did not explore, is the profound isight into the truth of the dependence of 
rationality on emotionality, the priority of emotion to reason, a discovery not completely 
unknown to such Western thinkers as Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, Sartre, and even Hume 
who subordinated the intellect to the emotions. We will summarize consolation philosophy in the 
following section and show that not only can we radic lize Asouzu, but also that we can exorcize 
the ghost of Hegel and in the process provide the challenge to world philosophy which Taiwo 
has so eloquently urged on us. This will mean providing a constructive alternative programme to 
ethno-philosophy. 
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Consolationism as the Radicalization of Senghor and Asouzu 
My own philosophical orientation, consolationism, is a philosophy rooted in everyday affairs. I 
look around me and see all the indicators of a verywretched condition of human existence. Man 
has to contend with moral evil (for example, wars, mass murders, corrupt practices, and violent 
religious fundamentalism) and physical evil (for example, the impact of devastating earthquakes 
and hurricanes on human life). Consideration of this bleak state of affairs makes me ask whether 
there is any meaning to human existence, and whether the universe itself has a purpose. Even as I 
ponder this question, it strikes me that neither science nor religion nor philosophy has found any 
compelling solution to the problem of the origin of the physical universe and of life. Yet this 
bleak picture is just one aspect of a Janus-faced reality. Just as there is terror in the world, so also 
is there beauty. A state of peace endures side by side with the state of conflict. Good constantly 
seeks to neutralize evil. I therefore consider consolation philosophy to be a fatalistic philosophy 
because it seeks to reconcile the pessimistic view of the universe with the optimistic view given 
the stark reality of terror and beauty in the world. Consolationism is a systematic philosophy that 
seeks answers to the following two basic questions: 
(1) Is human life futile? 
(2) Is the universe pointless? 
 
The master doctrine I found, the key to answering the questions posed above, is the doctrine of 
mood. I seek to formulate a coherent African metaphysical system with implications for 
epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of science, applied philosophy, and comparative 
philosophy. I seek to give world philosophy a compelling African synthesis that does not look to 
Greece for inspiration. In consolationism I seek a synthesis that provides solutions to the great 
questions of philosophy from a non-Western perspectiv , while remaining firmly rationalistic 
and keeping in touch with the 21st century man, the melancholy man. 
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Consolationism substitutes determinism with fatalism, and conceives the latter as a higher 
necessity than the former. This is so because of the failure of determinism to account for the 
universe as uniformly structured and perfectly intelligible. The reality of evil in the world 
strongly suggests that the world is not a perfect expression. Effects in the world cannot be traced 
with certainty to a spontaneous beginning in the causal series. The Big Bang theory of the origin 
of the universe and the creation theory of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for example, cannot 
be practically demonstrated: these theories are speculative. 
 
Furthermore, if the universe cannot be accounted for with certainty and if what we know about it 
points to its imperfection, then this universe must exist fatalistically, in the sense of being an 
inevitability - a necessity - that characterizes itself as yearning. I hypothesize that it is only by 
positing the universe as mood and the development of mood that we can show that existence is 
an imperfect expression in which beauty evolves out of terror, a higher state of completeness out 
of a lower state. I call this process the dialectic of mood. Mood is the primordial intelligence 
which I identify with God in His phase of impersonality. Terror and beauty, subsisting at the 
cosmic level, are apprehended by man in his sadness and joy. Sadness and joy are perceived by 
the human intellect as pessimism and optimism. Thus consolationism is an idealistic system, 
since it places a primitive mind at the foundation of the universe. 
 
Consolation philosophy traces its inspiration from the African community that endures, through 
the African light shed by the academic ethno-philosophers and the vision of Senghor, to the 
rationalism of Asouzu. Nyerere (1968, 11 ff.) has shown us that the traditional African 
community operates a system of communalism or familyhood, an optimistic perspective boding 
well for humanity. The thoughts of ethno-philosophers such as Gbadegesin (1991, 27ff) and 
Gyekye (1995, 83ff) on the mind-body problem helped me put the question of the relation 
between reason and emotion in sharper focus. Senghor’s assertion that the African has a unique 
intuitive way of seeing the world set me on the path to determining the universalizability of his 
theory of knowledge. From Asouzu I borrowed the method of complementary reflection which 
enjoins African researchers not to be unduly worried by the influence of Western thought on 
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their researches because the human mind is uniform and seeks to uncover one reality. My break 
with Western philosophy is my attempt to substitute h  philosophy of being with the philosophy 
of mood. 
 
The assertion of the essential moodiness (that is, the yearning essence of existence, the totality of 
being) of reality may leave me open to the accusation of idealism. Mercifully, this will not be the 
accusation that I am a German idealist. My idealism, which, paradoxically, destroys and 
resurrects universal idealism, is an African idealism. It destroys universal idealism by erecting a 
primary doctrine of pessimism as accounting for the foundation of existence. Here I am different 
from Asouzu, who never explores the phenomenon of metaphysical nihilism and appears to 
overlook the problem of evil like the monists and absolute idealists of Western philosophy. 
Where Asouzu talks about the joy of being as an intellectual and emotional state realizable when 
missing links converge to reveal a more perfect whole, I talk of cosmic terror as the foundation 
of being and interpret the joy of being as the supreme recognition of the eternal sway of fatalism 
and ethical resignation to this same fatalism. In elevating the place of sadness in human 
consciousness and in constructing a pessimistic metaphysics that accommodates nihilism, 
consolation philosophy destroys idealism. In elevating the position of joy in human 
consciousness and in building an optimistic metaphysics on the doctrine of fatalism and, in the 
process, showing that nihilism is an exaggeration misunderstood by anarchists, consolation 
philosophy resurrects idealism. 
  
Consolation philosophy is the doctrine of mood - the system of thought animated by the emotion 
of life. A cursory examination of the process of perception indicates the burden of the mind as its 
emotion. The emotional burden of the mind has been d ied by the class of thinkers called 
logicians who, even as they are denying it, have to contend with cynicism and scepticism - the 
first symptoms of the emotional burden of the intellect. All disciplines are substantially the 
creations of the human intellect, but because this intellect is itself an emotion, its processes 
terminate ultimately in conscious or unconscious surrender to nihilism in its many forms. The 
logic of life is the emotionality of existence and the logic of the mind is the detachment of the 
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intellect, which logicians isolate from the other vaster logic. I insist that this same intellect is 
nothing more than a refined emotion. The intellect is understood either as the faculty of reason or 
the capacity for reason, for the logical and coherent structuring of our beliefs. The intellect, then, 
indicates rationality; but where is this reason coming from? 
 
The error in much of Western philosophy is the radic l separation of emotion from reason. 
Rationality has two basic dimensions, the ethical and the logical. A thing or proposition is said to 
be rational if and only if it satisfies a basic human demand that this thing or proposition should 
be good or satisfy the condition that warrants its being approved of. For instance, an act of 
apparently unprovoked murder is considered irrationl not because we are convinced that no 
reason can be found for the act but, fundamentally, because the act fails to meet the demand of 
goodness. To demand that an act satisfy the conditi of goodness is to subscribe to a moral 
imperative. This morality is fundamentally a demand of human emotion - the logic of life. I think 
that it is this point that Senghor was trying to demonstrate with his famous notion of black 
emotionality and white rationality. Even in the Western tradition, no less a philosopher than 
David Hume (1978, 415) has insisted that reason is subservient to passion. How then can the 
intellect mock the emotive faculty? Why must science denigrate poetry? Why must we think that 
one philosophy can be emotional or romantic (e.g. the philosophy of Unamuno or Senghor or 
even Spinoza) while another is logical or unsentimental (e.g. the philosophy of Descartes or that 
of Russell)? 
 
If the logic of the intellect has its origin in the primal logic of existence, precisely in emotion, 
then the intellect can never escape its emotional origin which is also its destiny. The entire 
meaning of man’s life is to be found in his joy and sadness. These primal emotions constitute 
yearning, which in its turn is a transcendental appe l to something higher than man - a Being that 
can help man realize happiness, the goal of all yearning. This Being is God. It does not matter 
whether He is the invention of man or whether He exists objectively. Just as one instinctively 
knows one exists, so does one involuntarily believe that God exists as a Being powerful enough 
to grant one the enduring happiness which the emotion of joy indicates but cannot realize, as 
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human joy is never permanent. Emotion is a demand that God should exist as the Supreme 
Being. The intellect can either endorse this demand s intelligible or cast a slur on it as 
unintelligible. In plainer words, the intellect can never reject the idea of God (which is at once 
concept and emotion). This is due to the fact that e rejection of this idea already entails its 
acceptance as we will soon see. The choice of believing is the emotional decision of the intellect. 
Emotion may be stronger at everyday levels of eating, drinking, mating, and social interaction, 
but it is not absent at higher levels of abstraction. Let us take the example of the philosopher or 
scientist who thinks that the logic of the intellect is able to detach itself from the logic of life in 
rigorous reasoning and analysis. 
 
René Descartes and Bertrand Russell were both philosophers and mathematicians, but they 
arrived at different conceptions of God through rigo ous thinking. While Descartes (1952, 213-
231) concluded that there is a God, Russell (in Durant 1926, 519-520) dismissed religion as 
mysticism, put his faith in science, and thought it is more likely that there is no God. So we have 
broadly identified two doctrines, theism or deism and atheism. Agnosticism is either theism or 
atheism; so we must ignore it. Agnosticism is theism f the agnostic believes in God but asserts 
that He is beyond human perception; it is atheism if the agnostic says that the utter transcendence 
of God implies the superfluity of the very concept of God. 
 
As the positive affirmation of faith in the logic of existence, theism is a display of emotion. As 
positive affirmation it is inspired by joy. The first demand of emotion, the primal energy of that 
which yearns, is the demand that God should exist. Atheists correctly suspect that theism is a 
kind of emotional outburst, an unreasoning and therefore foolish emotion. But so is atheism an 
emotion but not a foolish emotion, in the same way that theism is not a foolish emotion. When 
the atheist accuses the theist of inventing a god who is silent and invisible in order not to be 
shamed by the eternal postponement of the appearance of his god, he does not gloat for too long. 
His polemical triumph is terminated abruptly because the theist responds that in inventing his 
god he desires his invention, and desires it so earnestly from the top to the bottom of his being, 
so completely, that a possibility emerges which is as erted as a reality, the denial of which will 
60 Ada Agada 
 
amount to the denial of a concrete life that exists beyond doubt. This of course is the triumph of 
probability, upon which science itself depends. As soon as we begin to ask the questions “What 
is matter?” and “Why is there something?” the coherence of science dissolves and this same 
science is revealed as a body of beliefs - a dogma that seizes certainty for itself out of 
probability. Atheism is an emotion because it is the withdrawal of the affirmation of the theist, 
the refusal to affirm faith in the logic of life which, I say, insists on the demand that God should 
exist. The God-concept is already a given in consciousness. It only remains for this concept to be 
affirmed or denied. Its denial takes its first premise from the positive affirmation of the theist. 
 
First Fundamental                                         Derivative 
God exists.                                                  No, He does not exist. 
 
The first fundamental belongs to the theist. The derivative is the atheist’s. So the atheist, 
unfortunately, comes last. Before the atheist makes his denial, his supreme act of nihilist 
emotionalism, he goes through the three stages of cynicism, scepticism, and despair. He is 
cynical because he thinks. He is sceptical because he doubts. He despairs because he is 
dissatisfied with the absence he perceives instead of the presence of the theist. The proclamation 
of the non-existence of God brings satisfaction in the aftermath of the first spontaneous 
dissatisfaction. Both dissatisfaction and satisfaction are emotions. The satisfaction comes as the 
intellect’s vindication of its cynicism. The dissatisfaction is due to the collapse of an illusion. 
Thus despair corrupts the intellect by making it cyni al and sceptical. The cynicism and 
scepticism of the intellect do not constitute a rebellion against the God-concept er se, but rather 
indicate the intellect’s recognition of the fundamental tragedy of existence. This tragedy reveals 
emotion in its creative sway (the mythopoeic element of existence). The unending struggle of the 
intellect with despair underlines its emotionality. The height of this despair is atheism. 
 
It is important to show that the intellect itself is emotional to pre-empt detractors who may want 
to dismiss consolationism as a philosophy of emotion or as mere intellectual romanticism. 
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Consolation philosophy is a continuation of the African synthesis discovered by Senghor and 
advanced by Asouzu. It propagates the doctrine of m od as the key to the unravelling of the 
notion of fatalism. It is a doctrine of mood in the recognition of the fact that emotion animates 
thought. Emotion is the given logic of life which baffles the intellect in the despair of the 
intellect, for which fatalism is not enough. Yet surrender it must to fatalism. If existence has no 
reason to be what it is beyond the incontrovertible fact that it is, then this existence is a f tality. 
Yet it cannot be that existence is superfluous because it is characterized by yearning. As 
characterized by yearning, the meaning of existence is consolation. At the level of man’s 
existence, consolation resolves itself as joy and sadness meditated upon by human consciousness 
as optimism and pessimism. The sadness is basic, but the joy is real for that which yearns. The 
sadness is fundamental since the cosmic goal is consolation rather than perfection. The 
pessimism is basic, but the optimism constantly denies ihilism because of what Asouzu calls the 
future reference, the indication of the possibility of a realizable progress, even as it is necessarily 
indicated, within a totality that is yearning. Asouzu (2011, 105) condenses this insight into the 
imperative of complementary reflection: Allow the limitations of being to be the cause of yur 
joy. 
 
What content, synthetic or analytic, does Asouzu give to the principle above? “…, Ibuanyidanda 
philosophy seeks to show how the essential and accidental, how being and its various modes of 
expression form an integrated complementary whole,” writes Asouzu by way of promise. “Here, 
we wish to show how being becomes manifest as the authentic mutual joyous experience that 
unifies all missing links” (Asouzu 2011, 106). Asouzu is still writing actively. He has rendered 
great service to African philosophy, from which we cannot but benefit. 
 
The consolationist desires to find in philosophical f talism the grounds of the universe’s 
sufficiency. The question arises: “Can the doctrine of mood lead us to a conception of fatalism 
which in turn yields a notion of sufficiency that entails the necessity of the inevitable and 
therefore the compulsory existence of the universe?” Again this: “Can fatalism entail 
determinism?” How can we argue that sufficient conditions are prior to necessary conditions, 
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that what suffices produces what is necessary? Granted, the point I am trying to make is 
complex, as I seek to render more intelligible the matter of infinite regress raised by the 
supposition that determinism can give us a satisfacory explanation of the origin of the universe. 
The rule of causality says every event has a cause. This is necessity. But is it really true that for 
every effect there must be a cause? Let us assume that the phenomena of the world can be traced 
to God as First Cause. How do we account for God’s exi tence? Thus we see that the chance 
element previously discarded rears its head just when we think it has been permanently shut out. 
Here tychism (the notion that chance plays an important role in the evolution of the universe) 
threatens theological determinism. Yet dignifying chance by conferring creativity on it makes it 
an intelligent force - a directional cosmic impulse. The battle line is therefore drawn between 
determinism and indeterminism, with the one losing its character now and taking the form of the 
other again. 
 
My way out of this difficulty, the infinite causal regress, is to subordinate determinism to the 
notion of fatalism from the consolationist perspective. Fatalism then becomes the highest 
necessity, as that which throws up sufficiency. For something to exist it must meet the conditions 
of sufficiency. That which is must be sufficient, eith r in itself or in something which is 
sufficient in itself. The necessity of a thing’s existence can be abstracted from its sufficiency. We 
cannot generalize about a set of instances if we do not isolate particular instances. In causation 
this isolation of particular instances gives priority to sufficiency. For example, if standing in the 
hot sun for a long period causes headache and having malaria fever also causes headache, we 
have two causes producing the same effect and standing as conditions. Both conditions are 
sufficient rather than necessary if considered together. It is enough to have malaria to get a 
headache, yet standing in the sun also gives one a headache. However, when we isolate these 
instances and critically analyse them in their isolati n the conditions previously seen as sufficient 
become necessary. That is to say, sufficiency passes into necessity. 
 
Let us reconsider the example of headache caused by malaria. Moving from plurality to 
singularity, one gets a headache if and only if one has malaria. Applied to the puzzle of 
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existence, this point we have made indicates that logical certainty is extracted from existential 
probability. The universe must necessarily exist only because it is sufficient unto itself. Logic 
demands certainty (rigid determinism), but existence, which is expressed in plurality, gives us 
probability. Probability encompasses the inevitability of events as the limited mind of man 
grasps them. Existence does not give us a perfect universe structured with such precision that 
events can be traced with certainty through a chain of causation to a First Cause, but rather a 
universe expressed imperfectly, whose imperfection nevertheless indicates the possibility of 
progress. That which is probable is an imperfection hat yet points towards progress by reason of 
its existing essentially as consolation, fatalistically, having no reason for existing accessible to 
the human mind beyond the realization on the part of man that it yearns and is in motion. 
Existence indeed is an absolute unity, but this absoluti m is perceived by the human intellect as 
pluralism. The entailment of necessity by sufficieny supplies the only genuine reason for the 
validity of dialectic. 
 
As the ground of all actualities and possibilities, fatalism provides the sufficient condition for the 
existence of the universe. It accounts for the puzzle of necessity as an inevitability rooted in a 
yearning essence. Thus the universe, existence itself, s a fatality, and the mood of man mirrors 
an objective external state with which it is intimate. The clarification of this consolationist 
dialectic is the supreme struggle of consolation philosophy. While it is true that I have taken 
notice of the merits and demerits of the dominant Western philosophical traditions (in particular, 
rationalism, phenomenology, existentialism, and philosophical analysis), I must insist that my 
system is neither a development from Western existent alism nor a product of philosophical 
analysis. 
 
My system, consolationism, is African philosophy. Existentialism takes full account of man’s 
concrete situation, which is interesting, but fails to account for the fatality of the universe, thus 
preparing the way for the despair-laden postmodernist tradition. The almost entirely bleak vision 
of existentialism and postmodernism is contrary to the optimistic African spirit which Senghor 
hinted at ahead of Asouzu’s declaration. On its part, the analytical tradition dominant in England 
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and America relies too much on the power of language, and seeks unjustly to subordinate 
philosophy to science as if sounding ‘scientific’ will ever make the philosopher a scientist of 
notable scientific achievements. Linguistic analysis with some esoteric mathematical symbols 
thrown in here and there cannot achieve the task of consolation philosophy. If truly language is 
contemporaneous with thought (for it cannot be prior to thought), it is because the former is a 
development of primal thought: the mood of eternity. Language is subordinate to this mood. 
Thought itself is an evolutionary fragment of mood. Language cannot create a pain. Thought may 
express this pain, but mood is this pain itself. Consequently, while taking note of the Anglo-
American analytical tradition’s emphasis on clarity, consolation philosophy is not particularly 
enamoured by it. 
 
Conclusion 
By now African philosophy ought to have contributed immensely to the enlightenment of the 
broader African society. This enlightenment has not happened because the continent has not 
produced original and exciting philosophers capable of capturing the intellectual imagination of 
the educated section of the broader society. Newspaper columnists in Nigeria love quoting the 
Western existentialist philosophers since they cannot quote the unquotable lines of the tribal 
philosophers of Africa. The failure to produce great thinkers has left African intellectual life 
without an intellectual compass. Consequently, the continent wallows in underdevelopment, 
mocked, despised, and pitied by the rest of the world. A philosophy is needed now that will leap 
off the shelves of university libraries and engage th larger society in the most lucid, yet 
profound discourse. 
 
If it is true, as I have endeavoured to show, that African philosophers have not adequately 
justified the existence of African philosophy, must we still blame Western intellectual racism and 
dishonesty for our intellectual diffidence, our lack of intellectual curiosity? When Wiredu (1998) 
sent out his famous call for decolonization, he was demanding originality and audacity from 
African thinkers. If we believe we cannot produce our wn Spinoza, Russell, Plotinus, etc, we 
are still cowering in the shadow of intellectual coonialism. If this inferiority complex will deny 
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us our 21st century triumph, then Wiredu, in crying out for decolonization, has laboured in vain. 
Can African philosophers be intellectually honest and curious enough to attempt to provide the 
solution to the puzzle of a tradition that, having been born as ethno-philosophy, has refused to 
grow robustly? We must provide a positive answer to this question by looking beyond ethno-
philosophy and embracing the era of radical individual thinking. 
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